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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of tl1e 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL EWAN, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
-vs-
IL·\ Y BUTTERS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10086 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries .arising 
out of an automobile-pedestrian accident that oc-
curred November 21, 1962, at approximately 9th 
~orth and Beck Street in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury.· At the conclusion 
of plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the action upon the ground that plaintiff (pede-
strian) was guilty of negligence as a m·atter of law. 
This motion was granted by the .court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
.. . . 
.. Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment .and 
that the case be remanded for trial. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Those facts cited in Appellant's Brief are sub-
stantially correct. However, other facts in the record 
must be set forth to give a clear and complete picture 
of the events .and circumstances surrounding this 
accident. 
The accident occurred November 21, 1962, at 
approximately 7:00 P.M. (R. 44). It occurred on 
Beck Street at approximately Ninth North in Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Beck Street is 
a continuation of Second West Street in Salt Lake 
City and is the m.ain highway northbound from Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The accident in question occurred 
approximately 1195 feet south of the intersection 
of Beck Street and Victory Road. Beck Street at the 
point of this accident trends generally north and 
south (Ex. 1 ) . It consisted at this time of six lanes 
for moving traffic (three northbound and three 
south·bound) plus an island dividing northbound and 
southbound traffic which at that time was delineated 
by solid painted lines. The overall width of the 
highway including the island was 105 feet 5 inches. 
The distinguishing landmark in the area where the 
accident occurred is a "M.ars" Service Station, which 
sits on the east side of Beck Street (Ex. 1). 
The accident between plaintiff and the vehicle 
operated by defendant occurred at a point in front 
of the southerly driveway or entrance to the "Mars" 
Station in the outside or easterly of the three north-
bound traffic lanes (Ex. 1, R. 46-47). 
2 
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Since the only question before the court is whe-
ther plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, an 
analysis of plaintiff's testimony concerning her con-
duct immediately before the accident is essential, and 
this testimony will be explored in detail. 
Plaintiff left her home at 524 East 1st South, 
on ~ovember 21, 1962, between 6:30 and 6:45 P.M. 
( R. 40, 44). She was to visit a prospective customer 
for the purpose of demonstrating a "Relax.acizor", 
which she sold on a part time basis · ( R. 42) . Her 
appointment was on Duluth Street, which she be-
lieved to be in the vicinity of north Beck Street (R. 
44). 
Plaintiff traveled west from her home to Second 
\Vest Street and then north along Second West 
Street past the S~. Mark's Hospital at Seventh 
North .and continued north to approximately the 
point where Victory Road intersects with Beck 
Street (R. 45). As plaintiff was proceeding she had 
noticed a street on the west side of Beck Street that 
said ''Beck Street". She turned around in the vicini-
ty of Covey's Service Station and headed back south 
on Beck Street to check this street sign. As she 
reached this street, she turned west and discovered 
that it was not a street ( R. 45). Mter proceeding 
west about one hundred feet, her vehicle became 
stuck in mud ( R. 45-46) . 
She walked back up to Beck Street and noticed 
the "~Iars" Service Station, which was slightly north 
of her position on the east side of Beck Street (R. 
3 
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46). She intended to go to the "Mars" Station to 
obtain assistance in removing her car from the mud. 
She then walked north to a point on the west side of 
Beck Street directly opposite the south driveway of 
the "Mars" Station (R. 46). 
Plaintiff then looked to the north for traffic 
and observed none. She then looked to the south and 
observed two pairs of car headlights approximately 
two blocks away in the vicinity of the Warm Springs 
Plunge ( R. 46) going at a slow speed. She estimated 
their speed at twenty miles per hour (R. 47). 
Plaintiff then testified on direct examination to 
the following events: 
"Q. Now would you tell the jury what 
you saw to the left? 
A. As I looked to the north towards 
Ogden? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No traffic whatsoever. 
Q. And you have already told the jury 
what you saw to the right, or to the south? 
A. Right. 
Q. And what did you do upon making 
this observation? 
A. Started to cross. It was n1y only 
way to cross. 
Q. And in what direction did you travel, 
or how did you cross the street? · 
A. Almost straight. 
4 
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Q. To what point? 
A. To the beginning of the driveway of 
the Mars Service Station. 
Q. And what direction would that be to 
point "A"? 
A. Well, isn't point "A" the end of the 
driveway? Is this the end of the driveway? 
Q. This is a curb and this is the first 
entrance. 
A. Well, to the first entrance. 
THE COURT: Well, were you going 
fron1 west to east? 
A. From west to east, yes. Yes, I was. 
Q. To point "A" is that where you were 
going?. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What was the next sensation after 
- did you get across the street? Let me ask 
you that. 
A. I viewed what I have already ex-
plained; decided there was no problem at all; 
started walking across the street and the last 
I ren1ember was plain walking with absolute-
ly no problem, no danger to myself. And the 
next thing I remember I was in the middle of 
the street with somebody holding my head. 
Q. Do you remember how far across the 
street that you got? 
A. I had only - almost crossed the 
street, and it was a shock to me to wake up 
and find that I was any place but across the 
street." ( R. 4 9-51) . 
5 
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On cross-examination plaintiff testified to these 
events as follows: 
''Q. As I take it then, you checked these 
cars and saw them to be down the street-
A. Yes sir. 
Q. - two blocks? And you walked 
across the first lane of traffic on the west 
side of the street without ever looking to the 
south ag.ain? 
A. The last I remember was just plain 
walking. 
THE COURT: Now just answer his 
question. 
Q. Just answer my question. You start-
ed on the west side of the street, crossing the 
street towards the Mars Service Station and 
you walked across the first lane and you never 
looked to the south while you were doing that? 
A. I cannot say I did not look, but I can-
not say I didn't. 
Q. The last thing you did before you 
started across was to look at the traffic be-
cause you saw the cars two blocks away? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Now as you were crossing the street 
did you ever look to the north again, as you 
were crossing the street? 
A. This is what I do not remember. 
Q. There were no cars coming fron1 the 
north, is that right? 
A. That's right. 
6 
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Q. So according to the be best of your 
recollection then, you walked from the west 
~ide of Second West Street completely across 
the west side of the road, ·completely across 
the center lane and completely across two lanes 
of traffic without ever looking to the south? 
A. I did not say I didn't look. I don't 
remember. The last I remember was just plain 
walking. 
Q. I know. But the best of your recol-
lection is you did this without again looking to 
the south? 
A. I have no recollection. 
Q. Well, that is what I am getting at. 
You remember being in an accident? 
A. I remember waking tlp. I don't re-
tnember the impact. 
Q. All right. You remember waking up. 
Do you remember being there at the scene of 
the accident? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Do you remember what you did be-
fore you started across the street? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You remember going out there and 
looking at the sign with Beck Street on it? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You remember getting stuck in the 
yard? 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q. You remember there was a Mar~ 
Service Station across the street? 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. So that your recollection concerning 
the facts of this accident are good, are they 
not? 
A. Yes." (R. 76-77). 
While it appears from the evidence that plain-
tiff had a distinct recollection of all events imnle-
diately preceding the collision, including a memory 
of the approxin1ate point on the roadway where the 
accident occurred, she did not recollect looking to the 
south for traffic after she left the west shoulder of 
Beck Street and started walking east. From plain-
tiff's Exhibit 1 (map of Beck Street) we learn that 
she ttaversed approximately 100 feet across six traf-
fic lanes and an island. For this distance either she 
did not look to the south for traffic again or if she 
did look, failed to heed th1at which was clearly there 
to be seen. Granting plaintiff the right to have the 
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to her, 
this conclusion is still inescapable. 
The other evidence of plaintiff consisted of an 
expert who would have testified that the defendant 
was traveling forty-five miles per hour immediately 
before the accident ( R. 115) and a traffic engineer 
who testified that the average person will walk at 
the rate of approximately 4.5 to 5 feet per second 
(R. 109). 
In addition Mr. Palmer L. Arnesen who oper-
8 
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atPd the "M·ars" Station testified concerning the 
road conditions, landm·arks, and lighting in the area 
(R. 23 through 37). Dr. Robert Earl Morrow, plain-
tiff's physician, testified concerning her injurie'S (R. 
82). 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MAT .. 
TER OF LAW AND SUCH NEGLIGENCE 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. 
The lower court in this case dismissed the Com .. 
plaint of plaintiff at the conclusion of her evidence 
and based its dismissal on the finding that plaintiff 
"either (a) Failed to maintain a reasonable and 
proper lookout for the defendant's automobile or (b) 
Having observed said automobile, failed to yield the 
right of way to the defendant's vehicle." 
Appellant correctly states in her Brief that in 
view of dismissal, the evidence, and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to her. The Respondent 
agrees that this is a correct statement of the law. 
Appellant claims that she had a right to cross 
Beck Street at this point because there was no cross .. 
walk available within 700 feet. She also correctly 
points out that she had a duty to exercise due care 
and caution and a duty to yield the right of way to 
all vehicular traffic. 
Appellant then argues that the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case do not unerringly point to 
the conclusion that she was guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law, but on the contrary that the facts 
and circumstances of the accident show that reason-
able minds could differ on this point. Nowhere in 
her Brief, however, does Appellant point out those 
10 
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facts or evidence upon which a jury cauld conclude 
that she was in the exercise of due care. As a matter 
of fact, there is no substantial dispute in the evi-
dence. All of the testimony concerning the plaintiff's 
due care or the lack of it came from her. We find in 
reviewing her testimony that she stopped on the west 
side of Beck Street directly across from the south 
driveway of the HMars" Station ·and looked for traf-
fic both north and south. She observed no traffic 
approaching from the north and in looking south 
observed two cars .approximately two blocks away. 
She could only see the headlights of these cars and 
concluded thereby that they were travelling approxi-
mately 20 n1. p.h. ( R. 4 7). She felt that there was no 
problem and started walking across the street. ( R 
50) She then proceeded approximately 100 feet 
across the street .and was struck in the outside lane 
of three northbound lanes. 
Appellant did not remember whether she there-
after looked for traffic between the time she left her 
position of safety on the west side of Beck Street and 
the point of collision. (R. 76) Significantly, how-
ever, she did remember that the accident occurred 
in the outside of three northbound traffic lanes (R. 
51) and remembers walking from the west side of 
Beck Street to the point of collision. (R. 80) She 
remembers being at the scene of the accident (R. 
77) and she remembered wh.at she did before she 
started to cross the street. She testified extensively 
on cross-examination concerning her recollection of 
ll 
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the events of the accident and concluded as follows: 
"Q. So that your recollection concern-
ing the facts of this accident are good, are 
they not?" 
''A. Yes." (R. '77) 
The only two things that plaintiff did not remember 
concerning the accident was the actual moment of 
impact and whether she had looked to the south at 
any time after she left the west side of Beck Street 
and started walking across the highway. 
It is understandable that .a person would have 
no memory concerning the actual moment of a colli-
sion. This is a recognized medical phenomena and 
was testified to by Dr. Morrow. (R. 104) But it is 
not usual for a person to forget or be unable to 
recollect certain events concerning an accident and 
recollect others. 
Dr. Morrow testified that plaintiff was unable 
to recall the actual event of the accident. (R. 88) 
Without referring specifically to plaintiff, Dr. Mor-
row testified in response to questions from the Court 
as follows concerning this medical phenomena: 
"The Court: The lapse of memory con-
tinues only for .a short time? 
A. Yes Sir. 
Q. And after a short time, they should 
remember? 
A. Yes Sir. But they only forget for a 
short period of time. They may not ever re-
member seeing a car come upon them. The 
12 
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first thing they remember is that they have 
had the accident. They don't remember how it 
happened. They haYe only had a short lapse 
of memory." (R. 89) 
Plaintiff asks th.at we accept her testimony that 
she had no rnernory or recollection wh,atever of hav-
ing looked to the south for approaching traffic after 
she left the west side of Beck Street. Assuming that 
this testimony is correct, she then advances the pro-
position that since she has no memory one way or 
another on this point, that she is entitled to .a legal 
presun1ption; namely, that she was in the exercise 
of due care and that we must, therefore, conclude 
that she was maintaining a proper lookout. She 
argues further that in the absence of a preponder-
ance to the evidence to the contr.ary that this is 
sufficient to carry a verdict in her favor. 
The so called "presumption of due care" is 
sin1 ply not applicable in this case. First of all, in 
each case cited by Appellant where the presumption 
has been discussed the case is one of wrongful death. 
Plaintiff cites no case from this jurisdiction in sup-
port of her argument that the presumption should 
apply to a case of simple lapse of memory. In the 
case of J!echam v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 
285. the rule is stated to be as follows: 
''From the basic fact that a human being 
was accidentally killed, a presumption .arises 
which requires the tryer of the facts to assume 
the presumed facts, that decedent used due 
care for his own safety, in the absence of a 
prima facie showing to the contrary, but in 
13 
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this kind of a presumption upon the making 
of such showing, the presumption disappears 
from and becomes wholly inoperative in the 
case, and the trial from then on should pro-
ceed exactly the same as through no presump-
tion ever existed, or had any effect on the 
case." 
The Court then points out in Mecham v. Allen, 
supra, that "Such a presumption deals only with the 
burden of going forward with or the production of 
evidence." In a wrongful death case, there is a rea-
son for the rule. Ordinarily there is little evidence 
as to how the accident actually happened and it is 
thought desirable to place the burden of producing 
evidence on the defendant. 
Appellant, however, is asking this Court to ex-
tend the application of this presumption to a case 
where the plaintiff is alive and testified and merely 
had a lapse of memory concerning one fiact in the 
case. An extension such as is contended for by 
Appellant would open the door to .a great mischief. 
As a matter of common knowledge, it is seldom that 
a participant in an accident can remember all the 
details that created or led to the situation or com-
pletely recollect all of their actions immediately pre-
ceding an accident. Nonetheless a party with a faulty 
recollection would be entitled to have his case sub-
mitted to a jury in n1any instances. For instance, a 
party who did not recollect whether or not he stopped 
for a stop sign would be entitled to have a jury find 
14 
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that he did stop because those in the exercise of due 
carP, do stop. A party who could not recollect his 
degree of speerl would be entitled to have a jury find 
that it was reasonable because those in the exercise 
of due care travel at a reasonable speed. Many more 
illustrations could, of course, be set forth. We point 
these out to show that in such a situation, it would 
alway~ be incun1hent upon a defendant to produce a 
pritna facie case of contributory negligence. A Mo-
tion to Dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's case 
\vould become archaic in a negligence action and the 
trial of such action would become grossly unfair to 
a defendant. 
While the presumption of due care has been 
referred to above, it has been argued simply because 
it was raised in Appellant's Brief and not because 
Respondent believes it is material to this case. Re-
spondent's position is that plaintiff's own testimony 
and other evidence clearly show that she was negli-
gent as a matter of law and that such negligence 
proximately contributed to the accident and her in-
juries. The presumption, if it existed at all, dis-
appears from the case upon the production of the 
eYidence by either party. 
We further add that whether plaintiff remem-
bers looking to the south or not, the mere fact that 
she walked approximately 100 feet across the high-
\\ay and walked directly in front of one of the two 
approaching automobiles evidences in and of itself 
that she either did not look or having looked, failed 
15 
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to heed and yield the right of way to defendant's 
automobile. 
Plaintiff testified that she stopped on the west 
side of Beck Street directly across from the Mars 
Service Station and looked for traffic both ways. She 
observed two cars approaching from the south, but 
none from the north. She then crossed the highway 
to the point of the accident in the outside lane of the 
three northbound lanes, a distance from the west 
side of Beck Street of approximately 100 feet with-
out any recollection of again looking to the south. 
She was walking fast (R. 105) and continued in this 
manner to the place where the accident occurred 
(R. 50- 51). She did not stop or pause in the jsland 
or elsewhere on the highway, but conceded that she 
could have stopped in the inside lane of the three 
northbound lanes and avoided the two approaching 
vehicles which she had previously observed in the 
center lane and outside lane (R. 81). Mter Plaintiff 
left the west side of Beck Street, it is quite obvious 
that she thereafter took no precautions whatever to 
protect herself from what must have been a more 
and more apparent danger. 
In similar cases, this Court has concluded that 
such conduct is negligence as .a matter of law .. In the 
case of Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 
495, a pedestrian was killed in an accident that 
occurred at the intersection of Westminster Avenue 
and 1300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Court 
assumed that the pedestrian was in an unmarked 
16 
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cross\valk. However, the crucial question in the case 
\vas whether decedent failerl to keep a proper lookout 
for approaching traffic. The Court concluded that 
the pedestrian was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law and stated its reasons therefor as follows: 
"More convincing than the direct testi-
mony that deceased did not look, is the further 
evidence that deceased neither said nor did 
anything to indicate that he was at all aware 
of the danger presented by defendant's ap-
proaching automobile. He seems to have been 
\vholly unaware of its approach. Certainly he 
did nothing either to warn his wife, nor to 
rescue either himself or her from their posi-
tion of peril. On this evidence, it must be said 
as a matter of law that deceased either failed 
to look, or having looked, failed to see what 
he should have seen. 
". . . Of course we do not mean to i1nply 
that a mere glance in the direction of the ap-
proaching automobile would suffice. The duty 
to look has inherent in it the duty to see what 
is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it." 
A very similar case factually to this case is the 
case of Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P. 2d 
1047. This was a wrongful death case involving an 
automobile-pedestrian accident that occurred on the 
main highway in Orem, Utah. There were six lanes 
for moving traffic on this highway and they were 
separated by double yellow lines. The decedent pede-
strian had left a cafe on the west side of the highway 
stating that he was going home and had crossed to 
the east side of the highway when his wife called to 
17 
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him to return. He turned around and was walking 
back to the west side of the highway when he was 
struck by the vehicle of the defendant. No witness 
actually observed the accident occur. A directed ver-
dict was entered for defendant on the grounds that 
decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. In that case as in the case .at bar, Appellant 
urged a reversal on the following grounds : ( 1) The 
trial Court erred in finding decedent contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law because (a) Decedent 
is presumed to have been acting with due care and 
such presumption was not overcome and (b) Deced-
ent's contributory negligence was a question of fact 
improperly withheld from the jury. Appellant also 
urged that assuming decedent was guilty of negli-
gence, the question of whether his negligence proxi-
mately contributed to his death was a question of 
fact erroneously withheld from the jury. 
The Court in that case upheld the ruling of the 
lower court and stated: 
"On the evidence set forth the trial court 
correctly found decedent contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law. From a fair appraisal 
of the evidence reasonable men can draw but 
one inference and that inference points un-
erringly to the negligence of the decedent. In 
response to a call from his wife, decedent who 
was walking east across a poorly lit highway. 
turned and walked directly into the path of 
defendant's automobile. Crossing a highway 
at a point where there was no marked cross 
walk, decedent was duty bound to yield the 
18 
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right of way to a vehicle upon the roadway. 
See 41-6-79 Utah Code Annotated 1953. This 
he failed to do. He, in addition, apparen_tly 
failed to look, or having looked failed to see 
what he should have seen and paid heed to it. 
He sairl nothing and did nothing which indi-
cated he was in any way aware of the danger 
presented. Decedent was properly found neg-
ligent as a matter of law." 
As to the issue of proximate cause, the Court 
stated: 
"Decedent's negligence was a 'proxi-
mate' or 'legal' cause of his death. Generally 
speaking, the proximate cause of an injury is 
the primary moving cause without which it 
would not have been inflicted, but which, in 
the natural and probable sequence of events, 
and without the intervention of any new or 
independent cause, produces the injury .... 
"If decedent had yielded the right of way 
to defendant's automobile, or if he had looked 
up the road and seen the approaching car and 
paid heed to the danger which it presented, 
the accident would never have happened. It is 
patent that the negligence of the decedent was 
a substantial factor in bringing about his 
death." 
The parties in this case are in complete agree-
ment as to the legal duty on Plaintiff. On Page 15 
of Appellant's Brief, she states that her duty was to 
look and to continue to look and on Page 9 of her 
Brief, she states that she had the duty to yield to all 
Yehicular traffic. Her evidence clearly shows that 
she did neither. As she started walking fast across 
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the highway, she either failed to look or having 
looked, she failed to yield the right of way. In either 
event, she is negligent as a matter of law. 
Another Utah case in point is Smith vs. Bennett, 
1 Utah 2d 224, 265 P. 2d 401. In this case a pede-
strian was struck by a vehicle outside of a marked 
crosswalk on Second South Street west of 800 West 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. A directed verdict 
for defendant was affirmed on appeal. Except as to 
the proximity of defendant's automobile to plaintiff 
.at the time she attempted to cross the traffic lanes, 
there was no substantial dispute in the evidence. 
The Court observed: 
"Plaintiff chose to leave her preferred 
position as a pedestrian within a marked 
crosswalk and proceeded to walk down the 
center of a heavily traveled street. She placed 
herself in a position of peril. S.ant v. Miller, 
115 Utah 559, 206 P. 2d 719. By attempting 
to cross the street in disregard of safety rules, 
she was charged with a high standard of care, 
the duty being con1mensurate with the peri-
lous circumstances. All reasonable men must 
conclude that plaintiff by her conduct did not 
discharge the duty placed upon her ... '. 
· "In the instant case there was but one de-
mand upon plaintiff's attention. There is no 
room for a reasonable difference of opinion as 
to where her attention should have been con-
centrated; it was incumbent upon her to o.b-
serve the condition of approachin~ tra~f1~. 
Th.at she failed to use due care in doing so 1t IS 
manifest from the evidence." 
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Plaintiff also argues that she had rio duty to 
anticipate that defendant would disobey the law. She 
argues that a speed limit in this area was 25 m.p.h .. 
and that defendant was traveling 45 m.p.h at the 
time of the accident. While the negligence of defend-
ant or the lack of it is not an issue on this appeal, we 
meet the argument of plaintiff because the record 
does not support her conclusion that the speed limit 
was 25 mp.h. 
Mr. Palmer Arnesen testified for plaintiff in 
regard to the speed limit. He managed the "Mars" 
Station and also another station in Salt Lake City. 
He custon1arily journeyed between the two stations 
during the day and to do so would leave the "Mars" 
Station and travel north on Beck Street to the 'Covey 
Station where he would turn aroun·d to travel south. 
I-Ie stated that on the west side of Beck Street there 
\vas a construction speed sign which indicated 25 
n1.p.h. Sometin1es this sign was covered with ·a sheet 
of burlap and sometim·es not. The purpose was to 
slow traffic during the time con·struction was ~ctu­
ally in progress ( R. 28 - 29 - 30 - 3'1 - 313) . 
He testified further that .at the time of the acci-
dent, the highway had received its first coat of black 
top and that there was nothing in the highway which 
would limit or impede the speed of vehicles. He testi-
fied further that the speed limit along Beck Street 
was ordinarily 50 m. p.h ( R. 35 - 36) . 
This sign upon which plaintiff places so much 
stress was for southbound traffic. The evidence as 
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to speed for the northbound traffic (the direction 
of defendant's automobile) is that the speed limit 
was 50 m.p.h. ( R. 36). Plaintiff offered no evidence 
whatsoever to show any speed restriction as to north-
bound traffic. Her evidence that defendant was 
travelling 45 m.p.h. at the time of the accident is 
insufficient to show any breach of duty by defend-
ant. 
A statement from the auto-pedestrian case of 
Sant vs. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 P. 2d 719, where-
in a directed verdict in favor of the motorist was 
upheld, is pertinent in this regard. The Court stated: 
"He was required to anticipate that ve-
hicles move at different rates of speed; that 
the slower moving automobiles are required to 
drive on the right-hand side of their appro-
priate portion of the highway and faster mov-
ing vehicles pass to their left; that the faster 
moving vehicles may not continue in a direct 
line but may turn out from a straight forma-
tion to go around a slower moving car; and 
that such movements may be made by reason-
ably safe drivers if they do not know or have 
reason to be charged with knowledge that 
pedestrians will be in danger by such move-
ments." 
In this case, appellant was charged with the 
knowledge that vehicles do not continue to move at 
the same rate of speed nor do they continue to stay 
in the same lane of travel. For this, among other 
reasons, appellant was required to maintain a proper 
lookout for her own safety and to yield the right of 
way to vehicular traffic. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case and all inferences tc 
be drawn therefrom unerringly points to but one 
conclusion: That plaintiff failed to maintain a pro-
per lookout for vehicles upon the highway. She 
either saw the vehicles and then failed to take any 
precautions for her own safety or she failed to see 
and heed what was an ever increasing danger to 
herself. Upon this ground, the Court properly ruled 
that she was negligent as a matter of law and dis-
missed her action. 
The Judgment of the lower Court must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
:23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
